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ABSTRACT. Decentralization and people’s participation have been key features of
government environmental policy since the 1990s. In Madagascar, the policy of Secured
Local Management of Natural Resources, known as the GELOSE act, has created a
framework for the transfer of rights from central government to local communities. This
article analyses the practical implementation of this policy by focusing on the nature of
the rights transferred and on the nature of the contracts and incentives developed. The
Aghion and Tirole model for allocation of formal and real authority in an organization
is used to shed light on the contractual deﬁnition process and on the trade-offs between
giving responsibilities to local communities and losing control over natural resources
management. It is shown that a congruence of interests between the parties is crucial
for effective delegation of authority to local communities and that this congruence may
emerge in relation to the transfer of exclusion rights.
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This article was written following a one-week workshop held in Saint Denis, La
Re´union, in October 2001, on the various insights that could be obtained with
regard to the GELOSE contracting policy, from the viewpoints of economics, law
and anthropology, in which all the authors took part. It greatly beneﬁted from
the contributions to this workshop made by Philippe Karpe, law researcher at
CIRAD, and Serge Razaﬁarison, Ph.D. student in anthropology and consultant at
the GEMA&C. This research was supported by the European Union (EU) funded
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version of this paper was presented, in the BIOECON workshop on ‘Property-
related mechanisms for biodiversity conservation’ held in Rome on 30–31 May
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1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, decentralization and people’s participation inmanagement
have emerged as key trends in government environmental policy in
developing countries. The role of local populations in sustainable
management of natural resources has been more fully recognized and the
shifting of natural resource management from central to local government
is usually part of a broader decentralization process (Agrawal and Ostrom,
2001; Ribot, 1999). A considerable body of academic and policy literature
has been developed on these paradigms, and theoretical models have been
built to guide the decentralization of government policy and devolution
processes (Oates, 1972; Smith, 1985; Ostrom et al., 1993; Gerard-Varet,
1994; Cre´mer et al., 1996; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). A major assumption
well studied in the literature relates biodiversity loss to institutional
failures, such as ill-deﬁned property rights (Hanna and Munasinghe, 1995;
Sedjo, 1995; Schmid, 1995). Recent resource management literature focuses
on the idea that natural resources, as a source of biodiversity and a
basis for local development, could beneﬁt from the delegation of central
government authority (Cardenas, 2000). One of the main issues is to state
to whom natural resourcemanagement should be decentralized: grassroots
communities or local governments (Larson, 2002).
In Madagascar, in the middle of the last decade, a contractual
policy, known as GELOSE,1 was designed to transfer management of
natural resources from central government to rural communities. It was
implemented in response to two problems facing biodiversity conservation
policy. Human settlement had been increasing in the protected areas set
up by the ﬁrst National Environmental Action Plans (NAEP) since the
end of the 1980s (Weber, 1995; Bertrand and Weber, 1995). No biodiversity
management competencies were devolved upon local political structures,
reﬂecting a lack of awareness on the part of central administration about
customary local multiple uses management (Weber, 1995; Bertrand and
Razaﬁndrabe´, 1997). Authorization to use renewable natural resources
within protected forested areas and their adjacent zones was delivered
exclusively by the Forestry Administration. The state’s inability to
effectively supervise and control access to these protected areas thus led
to a situation of informal multi-governance of biodiversity and of de facto
open access to natural resources in protected areas, and hence to critical
degradation of natural resources (Weber, 2000; Hufty andMuttenzer, 2002).
It is well known that Madagascar possesses abundant biological
resources, with a large number of endemic species and a wide range of
ecosystems. In recent years, the risk of biodiversity loss has beenhighlighted
by scientists and taken up by international agencies and conservation
NGOs. The decrease in forest cover was assessed over a range of 1,000
to 2,000 km2 per year (Ganzhorn et al., 2001) and the total protected area
is of 15,574 km2. While primarily protection oriented, the actions of the
government and of external funding agencies have been progressively
inﬂuenced by an awareness of the need to link biodiversity protection
1 GELOSE stands for ‘Gestion Locale Se´curise´e’ i.e. ‘Secured local management of
natural resources’, including biodiversity outside the protected areas.
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with development (Razaﬁndrabe and Thompson, 1994). The two national
conferences of Antsirabe held in 1993 and Mahajanga held in 1994 stated
that this link must be achieved by transferring natural resources property
rights (see the Antsirabe declaration in Bertrand, 1995 and the Mahajanga
declaration in Weber 1995).
To address this situation, the GELOSE policy aims to promote the
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources (GELOSEAct 96-025).
Its basic rationale can be roughly described as a transfer of the state’s de jure
management right over certain renewable natural resources to local
communities which formerly exerted a de facto management right over
these resources based on customary rules. The local community must be
organized in a way that offers scope for deﬁnition of management rules
that will be effectively followed by its members, and that are in accordance
with the central government’s objectives.
However, what is really at stake in such policies remains partly unclear.
Two levels of questions have to be addressed. What is the precise nature
of the rights transferred through GELOSE contracts? And how can the
GELOSE contracts be characterized? The central concern is to understand
more precisely the interests of each party in these contracts. The Aghion
and Tirole (1997) model of allocation of formal and real authority in an
organization is used to shed light on the contractual deﬁnition process
and the trade-offs between giving responsibilities to local communities and
losing control over natural resources management.
In section 2, themain features and results of the Aghion and Tirole model
are presented. In section 3, the institutional and economic features of the
GELOSE policy are analysed. The stages of the contracting process are
then described and initial achievements in terms of signed and planned
contracts are presented. Then in section 4, the GELOSE policy is analysed
through the Aghion and Tirole model with a view to shedding light on
the major determinants of rights delegation from the government to local
communities. Section 5 examines the co-ordination issues that may arise
within each party due to their collective nature, along with the precise
nature of the transferred rights and of the contracts.
2. A rationale for delegating authority: the Aghion and Tirole model
As stated by Agrawal and Ostrom (2001), a major issue relating to
decentralization policy is the question of why central governments
attempt decentralization and the nature of the property rights devolved
by governments to local actors. Using the Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
framework, we intend to determine what is really at stake with the
delegation of rights and how the state stands to gain by relinquishing
its control and rights over natural resources management. Hence, we are
interested in the likelihood and conditions of successful delegation of rights
through GELOSE policy, given the interests of each stakeholder.
Theoretical models have been built that give insight into the key
mechanisms at stake with the implementation of natural resources
management policies as part of a decentralization process. In a
decentralized system, resource allocation should be more efﬁcient because
it is suited to local conditions and the lower information costs should
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favour policy implementation (Gerard-Varet, 1994). Oates (1972) shows
that decentralization can increase government responsiveness by enabling
public actions to adapt to local preferences. Besides having better
knowledge of local situations, local decision makers can be held more
accountable for their action (Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, 1993).
Downward accountability is also stressed as a key factor of the effectiveness
of decentralization by Agrawal and Ribot (1999).
The goals of decentralization largely coincide with the need for effective
natural resources management. One of the most striking features of natural
resourcesmanagement under central authority is its lack of information and
control over the state of the resources and their actual level of exploitation.
At the heart of the GELOSE devolution process is the active search for
information, as will be developed in sections 3 and 4. To address this
issue and draw some lessons from industrial organization (Cre´mer et al.,
1996), a model developed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) is used to analyse
the interactions between the granting of authority2 through delegation
and the acquisition of information and then the elements that may lead
to this delegation. The question is how to determine who has the right
to decide which project to implement. Though primarily focused on
organization in a business context, it can be extended to the institutional
framework for the management of natural resources. It could then be
formulated in terms of who should take decisions about how to select
natural resources management rules and what determines this mode of
organization.
2.1. The major features of the model
The theoretical framework is that of the incomplete contract theory
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). The complete outcomes of the possible
scenarios resulting from different choices of project implementation, or of
resource management rules in our case, cannot be totally predicted ex ante.
Consequently, the sharing of costs and beneﬁts cannot be fully speciﬁed
prior to contract deﬁnition. The decisions involved are too complex for
their outcomes to be speciﬁed completely in an initial contract. As stated
by Aghion and Tirole, the formal authority and the power to decide and
to exercise control3 over the use of an asset is given to a member of an
organization by the ownership of this asset. Authority may also result from
a formal or informal contract, which may then modify the prior structure
of property rights over the asset. If the contract does not specify who is to
decide in a particular case, this right belongs to the owner of the asset over
which the decision is taken.4 Real authority is given to a member, who may
or may not have the formal authority, when this member ﬁnally takes the
decision.
2 Simon (1947) deﬁned authority as the ‘right to select actions affecting part or the
whole of an organization’.
3 ‘ . . .virtually deﬁne ownership as the power to exercise control’ (Grossman and
Hart, 1986).
4 ‘We assume that the owner of each asset has the right to control that asset in the
case of a missing provision’ (Grossman and Hart, 1986).
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The ﬁrst step of the model is the allocation of authority between
the principal and the agent and, hence, the deﬁnition of the mode of
organization, i.e. integration or delegation. In integration, the principal is
able to overrule the decision taken by the agent. In delegation, the agent’s
decision takes precedence over the principal’s decision. What makes the
allocation of decision rights important is that the principal and the agent do
not have the same order of preferences for the possible projects. A measure
of the difference between the principal’s and the agent’s preferences is given
by two exogenous parameters of congruence, which reﬂect each agent’s
expectation about the beneﬁts he would enjoy if the other agent’s preferred
project was chosen (see model in appendix 1). In a second step, based
on these statements, each contracting party chooses how much to learn
about the projects. Then, the party which does not have formal authority
transmits part of the information he has acquired to the other party. The
latter, if he has enough information, decides which project to develop.
When he cannot make an informed choice, he is assumed to be better off
accepting theproject chosenby theotherparty rather than choosingaproject
arbitrarily.
The allocation of authority will partly determine the effort made by
each party to acquire information, given that this authority enables them
to decide which project will be developed and then to receive maximum
possible beneﬁt from it.
2.2. The results of the model
Aghion and Tirole show that two main beneﬁts arise from the delegation
of formal authority. These are ﬁrstly an increase in the agent’s initiative or
incentive to acquire information (and hence a reduction of the principal’s
overload). When given the authority to decide, the agent’s decision will not
be overruled by the principal. The agent is thus motivated to learn more
about the projects so as to make an informed choice and to implement his
preferred project. Secondly, delegation facilitates the agent’s participation
in the contractual relationship when the issuematters relativelymore to the
agent than to the principal. These results come at the cost of a loss of control
over the principal’s choice between the projects.
The principal will delegate formal authority to the agent when the
latter has better access to information and when their objectives are not
too different. Hence, delegation will be favoured by closer congruence
between the preferences of the principal and those of the agent. Whenever
the principal beneﬁts greatly from undertaking a project directly, formal
delegation is less likely to occur. On the contrary, it is favoured by the
agent’s interest in it, either for the beneﬁts at stake or for the importance of
not being overruled by the principal.
The formalization developed by Aghion and Tirole gives insight into
the trade-offs between giving autonomy to the local community in their
management decisions over the use of resources and maintaining the
authority of the central administration over these management decisions.
This model helps to identify the major determinants of effective delegation.
It is then used in the following to analyse the procedure of deﬁnition of the
GELOSE contract and to identify the key parameters of delegation.
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3. The GELOSE policy
In Madagascar, two major features of the institutional setting for
biodiversity management underpinned the emergence of the GELOSE
policy. The National Environmental Actions Plan (NEAP), run by the
National Ofﬁce of the Environment (ONE), was initiated in 1992. In its ﬁrst
phase, it focused on biodiversity conservation in 46 protected areas (PA).5
Twenty-one Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs)
were established around PAs for conservation purposes. They provide
support for resource uses in adjacent areas as a means of compensation.
In the second phase of the NEAP (1997–2002), more attention was paid to
developing the economic value of biodiversity.
The decentralization policy launched in April 1996 focused on the
creation and granting of powers to institutions deﬁned at regional and
local levels, and on the deﬁnition of development policies at those
levels. Regional and municipal governments (or district authorities) were
created by aggregating several fokolona that were the basic administrative
and territorial entities. This contributed to a decentralization of central
government control over natural resources and biodiversity that was
intended to solve the problems of overlapping responsibilities and
management competencies. This decentralization involved modiﬁcations
of property rights, not yet fully achieved.
3.1. Implementation of the GELOSE policy
The GELOSE policy was instituted by the act 96-025. It provides for the
contractual transfer of management responsibility for forests and other
renewable resources from the central government to rural communities,
organized into associations called ‘communaute´ locale de base’ (CLB, i.e.
grassroots community), on a country-wide scale. The act encompasses all
the resources of the state domain, i.e. forests, wild fauna, and ﬂora, together
withwater and rangeland. It institutes the CLB as an entitywith legal status
and legal personality. It also provides for recognition of customary rights.
Delegation is formalized by a contract for a renewable three-year period.
The GELOSE policy is implemented through institutional arrangements.
This nation-wide contracting process goes beyond the well-known ﬁgure
of the basic contract for protecting biodiversity between public institutions
and individuals (Simpson and Sedjo, 1992), by involving local communities
and potentially all resources.
The contracts delimit exclusive collective rights to be transferred to
the CLB members in a deﬁned area and obligations to be followed
for access to and use of the ecosystem resources. Contracts are set up
5 These consist of 18 national parks where non-commercial rights of use are granted
over deadwood for fuelwood and over, collection of fruits and barks for social and
religious practices (burial, customary rites); 23 special reserves, characterized by
a total ban on use or access, except for scientiﬁc purposes, and ﬁve fully protected
natural reserves with a ban on all rights of use. PAs are under the authority
of a conservation agency, the Agence Nationale de Gestion des Aires Prote´ge´es
(ANGAP), set up under the ﬁrst NEAP. They aremanaged directly by the ANGAP
or delegated to conservation bodies such as Conservation International or WWF.
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after a process of negotiation between three parties, central government
representatives (i.e. the Forest Administration), the municipal government,
and the CLB. Accommodation of interests is reached with the support
of a mediator. Contracts are designed for each ecosystem type and
for each community which has developed a particular set of uses for
the ecosystem resources. They include a formal agreement among the
community members for social enforcement of the contract terms (the
‘dina’). The GELOSE procedure can be seen as a way to improve the linkage
between the legal institutional framework based on state ownership of
natural resources and the customary laws governing the use of natural
resources within local communities (Bertrand andWeber, 1995). One of the
main issues regarding the GELOSE policy is to determine how the transfer
of property rights through the law – its enforcement and administration –
is liable to affect the behaviour of users of natural resources (Barzel, 1989;
Babin et al., 1999).
Prior to the NEAP and GELOSE implementation, the central Forestry
Administration managed the natural resources according to a timber-
oriented and well-established legal system of resource harvesting
regulation and of taxation. Nevertheless, this system did not achieve
effective control over actual multiple uses of forest resources. A state
ownership regime over the ‘state domain’ covering most land and natural
resources encompassed the PAs and gazetted forest (for biodiversity and
forest conservation), the productive forests (for timber and fuelwood
production) and agricultural land (for crop production). Over the entire
‘state domain’, the central government authorizes customary users’
rights, excluding the right to sell natural resources. These rights are
limited and not recognized on a legal basis, but they have a social
legitimacy (Razaﬁndrabe, 1997). Rights for commercial exploitation and
management rights are attributed by the Forestry Administration over
agricultural lands and forests, or productive forests. Productive forests
are divided into concessions granted to timber companies. Administrative
licences are required for hunting and ﬁshing. Felling and clearing on
agricultural land are subject to the authorization of the central government
representative in the village, the Local Commission for Security (LCS), and
to felling permits attributed by the Forest Administration. Private land
ownership rights, guaranteed by an ofﬁcial land title, are effective over
6–10 per cent of the national land. But since decentralization has been
implemented, ownership rights obtained by clearing can be registered by
the municipal government and exchanged even without an ofﬁcial land
title.
With the implementation of the GELOSE policy, a redeﬁnition of the
‘state domain’ has become necessary. The state remains the sole legal
owner of natural resources over the entire national territory (except when
private land ownership rights have been deﬁned) and the guarantor
of their integrity. But some autonomy is given to local communities in
their decisions about resource uses on a deﬁned community area. In the
contracting process, local communities can be granted exclusive use and
management rights over the ‘state domain’ in order to foster security of
land tenure and resource management. GELOSE is seen as a way of sharing
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property rights over biodiversity to reduce the government cost of control
(Babin et al., 1999; Aubert, 2002).
3.2. The contracting process
Four steps6 must be completed before the contract is signed. The transfer
of rights then becomes effective for three years.
The request
The process is initiated through a request7 expressed by the local
community for the right to manage some speciﬁc natural resources. This
request is transmitted by an operator who may be either the ONE or
an NGO. The process is based on a case-by-case approach, which is
contingent to the local context and to speciﬁc issues. In many cases,
the main issue is to limit the assignment of permits by the Forestry
Administration to people outside the community or to avoid entry into
a PA. When the request is accepted, negotiation is initiated with the
state representative (i.e. the Forestry Administration) about the mode of
transfer.
Identiﬁcation of stakeholders’ interests and claims
To implement the law and draw up contracts, information is required on
the biological state of the resource, its boundaries, the nature of current
uses and the various claims for allocation of rights over the ecosystem. This
information is reviewed in this second stage. The delimitation of the area
and of the resources covered by the contract is a crucial issue negotiated
not only with the Forestry Administration but also with the neighbouring
communities.8
Information is acquired with the support of a mediator who facilitates
dialogue between the administration and local stakeholders. One of the
major features of the GELOSE policy is the way it interlinks the legal
systemmanaged by the Forestry Administration and the customary system
that governs the uses of resources within the communities. Hence, the
mediator must be familiar with the practices of both systems. The mediator
has been seen as an external and neutral agent whose role ends with the
signature of the contract. Ideally mediators are state agents who receive
speciﬁc training before becoming mediators (Andriatahiana et al., 1996).9
They must originate from the region where they work. The mediator plays
an important part in the process of fostering compatibility between the
two parties’ objectives, with regard to what may be allowed within the
forest law and the nature of the community’s claims. Part of the mediation
process consists in identifying medium-term objectives with respect to the
6 The procedure, and the different steps it encompasses, has been speciﬁed by the
National Ofﬁce for the Environment in charge of the GELOSE policy.
7 This request is called the ‘claim’ (‘de´claration d’intention’).
8 A map of the area is established detailing the allocation of the delimited
community area to agricultural uses, harvesting of forestry products, etc.
9 Since 1998, theMalagasygovernment has hiredpeople and trained them tooperate
as mediators.
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management of natural resources through dialogue between community
members and between the community and the administration (Weber, 1995,
2000). Commitment to these objectives is seen as a means for resolving
conﬂicts, and rules are designed on the basis of these objectives. The
information on the current and potential uses of the resources becomes
common knowledge for all the contracting parties.
The contract and its terms and conditions
The third step consists in drawing up the contract. During the mediation
process, the CLB takes part in the decisions about permitted land uses
over a speciﬁc area. These are included in the collective management plan
for natural resources, called the ‘Plan d’ame´nagement et de gestion simpliﬁe´e’,
which is at the core of the contract and is described in a map. It gives the
framework within which the CLB will decide who can make use of the
resources.
The technical conditions for exercising community management rights
as well as the conditions of non-compliance that entail suspension of the
contract by the government representatives are laid down in the terms
and conditions appended to the contract. These conditions refer to the
prohibited areas or species, the limits of resource use by households such
as quotas, technical restrictions of exploitation, the felling speciﬁcation, the
nature of the permits that may be granted directly by the community, and
the ﬁnancial resources the community is allowed to derive from delivering
non-commercial but also, in some cases, commercial usage rights (taxes and
fees).
Control and sanctions
The fourth stage aims to describe the control and sanction mechanisms
that will ensure that the community complies with the designated rules.
Sanctions, mainly ﬁnes, are imposed through the ‘dina’, which is a
customary community convention used in the Malagasy society to settle
social conﬂicts. Thus, the CLB is responsible for ensuring that community
and non-community members comply with the rules speciﬁed in the
contract. Supervision is performed by an executive management structure
set up within the CLB. The ‘dina’ is approved by the municipal government
and proclaims the legitimacy of the CLB. The reliance on the ‘dina’ for
contract enforcement helps to bridge the gap between the legal system and
the customary institutions (Aubert, 2002).
3.3. Initial achievements
The ﬁrst contracting process was initiated in 1997 in a forest zone near the
ICDP’s Marojejy National Park. In 2001, 32 contracts were signed and 53
were about to be signed (ONE, 2001). These contracts were analysed using
a three-fold methodology. An extensive survey of existing studies (by ﬁeld
experts) and of actual contracts was undertaken. A focus group, including
representatives of ONE and researchers, was set up to establish a typology
of these contracts and a framework for their analysis (Aubert et al., 2001).
Fieldworkwasdone in two regions to study actual contract enforcement, on
the basis of this framework (surveys in ﬁve villages near the Andapa ICDP,
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where contracts have been signed over the last three years). Observation
of the start of the negotiation process for one contract in a third region
(on raphia on the East Coast) completed our analysis. The contracts were
reviewed by ONE to obtain a broad overview of the achievements and
difﬁculties of the GELOSE Policy (ONE, 2001; Maldidier, 2001).
As shown in appendix 2, transferred resources aremostly forest resources
located on the periphery of protected areas. This is an illustration of the
early rationale of GELOSE, i.e. to prevent settlements in PAs and gazetted
forests. This can also be linked to the role of the operator, the contracts
being implemented where a pre-existing structure plays a role in resource
management or conservation. The case studied showed that these operators,
especially international nature conservation agencies or NGOs, are not
only the transmitters but also the instigators of the community request.
The operators, involved in natural resources management long before the
GELOSE process began, and thus known by the local communities, usually
take part in the process by appointing their own informal mediators. They
may even prevent the formal mediators from contributing efﬁciently to the
negotiation process. These operators have their own objectives and may
inﬂuence the autonomy of the other contracting parties in the deﬁnition of
management rules (Pe´chard, 2002). This issue is due partly to a questioning
of the legal mediator’s legitimacy that occurs in most cases, even though
objective criteria for selection and capacity building of agents chosen to
assume the role of mediator have been developed. These cannot always be
fulﬁlled due to a lack of ﬁnancial resources. Consequently, the mediator’s
role has often been restricted to operational tasks, such as drafting the terms
and conditions of the contract (Maldidier, 2001).
Moreover, the transferred resources are often over-exploited and the
ecosystem degraded. There is broad awareness about management
improvement requirements, but freedom of action for improvement is
limited. Hence, one of themost important requirements stressed byOstrom
(1999) for achieving successful community-based forest management is not
met.
The transferred rights are usually non-commercial use rights as far as
timber and forest resources are concerned and commercial withdrawal
rights mainly for fuelwood, raphia and other non-forest timber products.
Studies have shown that, in some cases, the allocation of non-commercial
withdrawal rights serves the interests of local communities by allowing
them to prevent private loggers or traders from exploiting their resources
(Maldidier, 2001). CLB are granted rights to exclude outsiders: migrants,
private loggers . . . . Real management rights, deﬁned by Schlager and
Ostrom (1992) as ‘the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform
the resource by making improvements’, are not transferred in most of the
cases studied. CLBs are not allowed to convert forested areas to other uses
such as farming. Authorization for clearing remains under the Forestry
Administration’s authority. In some instances, the clearing ban has been
reinforced with the GELOSE contract, as is the case in the Andapa area
(Pe´chard, 2002).
Compliance of the CLB members with the terms of the contract is
encouraged by the following main incentives. CLB members may be
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compensated for accepting the clearing ban. They may be given the right
to choose previously forbidden patterns of resource uses, such as livestock
grazing in forested areas. They can also stipulate, through the contract, the
conditions under which endangered resources are exploited by outsiders
(e.g. the raphia exploitation by traders is regulated by rules stated in
the contract). They may receive guarantees regarding the conservation
of current land uses. Agricultural land use may be legalized in some
forested areas in exchange for a community effort to limit exploitation and
rehabilitate other forested areas. In the Andapa area, part of the national
park has been set aside, downgraded to ensure that a signiﬁcant area
can be transferred to the communities.10 Grants and training for forest
maintenance or agroforestry practices may be provided, though this is not
widespread.
Because implementation of GELOSE was claimed to be too slow and
complex, a new forestry policy was deﬁned in 1997 to foster the contractual
management of all types of forests, except for protected areas. This policy
is instituted by the act 2001-122 and simpliﬁes the conditions under which
the rights transfer and the contract may be implemented and enforced. But
less emphasis is placed on enforcing secured land tenure.
4. Some insights for analysing the GELOSE policy
The Aghion and Tirole framework of analysis is applied to the general
GELOSE policy procedure. The hierarchical relationship between the
central government, which owns the natural resources over allMadagascar,
and the local communities, which claim to have rights over the use of these
resources in speciﬁc areas, can be compared with the relationship between
a principal who hires an agent to implement a project and this agent, as
described in the Aghion and Tirole (1997) model. Through the GELOSE
contract, the delegation deals with decision right over natural resources
previously held by the central government.
4.1. The stakeholders and the contracting parties
As previously noted with regard to the legal system, two actors play a
prominent role in natural resources management. The ﬁrst is the Water
and Forestry Administration,11 which deﬁnes and implements the timber-
oriented forest policy. The other is the municipal government. As part of
the decentralization process initiated in Madagascar in the mid 1990s, it
was set up and given control over territorial development policies. Hence,
these two institutions are both parties to the contracts that transfer rights to
local communities.However, themunicipal government does not constitute
an effective key player in the process. It generally has no more than a
consultative role in the process of contract deﬁnition. It is given a right to
supervise contract implementation to ensure that resource management
is effective and not prejudicial to the local and regional development
10 Ramboavelo J., WWF Ecological Unit of Andapa IDCP, Personal Communication.
11 This administration has staff throughout Madagascar who act as state
representatives for natural resources management. These local representatives
are those who sign the GELOSE contracts.
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plans. But our ﬁeld work showed that the participation of the municipal
government in the contract does not substantially modify the scheme of the
management rules to be deﬁned and, hence, the possible beneﬁts resulting
from them. Therefore, in what follows, and for the purpose of drawing a
parallel between the Aghion and Tirole model and the GELOSE contract
deﬁnition, we will refer to the contract as if it were signed only by the
central government, represented by theWater and Forestry Administration
on the one hand, and by the CLB on the other. The decision, equivalent to
that of choosing between various projects that will yield different beneﬁts,
is basically that of choosing the management plan. The chosen rules will
determine the costs and beneﬁts to the two parties.
4.2. The beneﬁts of delegation
Beneﬁts of contract implementation for the two parties may vary widely
from one to another, as all the contracts do not encompass the same
natural resources and the same uses and rights. The extent of the resources
and of the uses covered, and then the degree of autonomy given to the
local community for deﬁning natural resources management under the
contract, depend both on the request of the local community, which is
based on its own speciﬁc needs and preoccupations, and on the interests
at stake from the viewpoint of the central government. Implementation of
the GELOSE contract may modify existing customary rules and/or create
new ones, speciﬁcally designed to ensure sustainable management of the
resources considered in the contract, or it may simply provide for legal
enforcement of existing customary laws. The CLB becomes responsible for
ensuring effective implementation of the contract rules and compliance of
its members and other users with the designated rules. Depending on the
speciﬁc termsof the contract, the local communitymaybegiven the effective
right to decide who can beneﬁt from the natural resources considered in the
contract and how each agent can beneﬁt from them. Or, when commercial
rights are assigned by the Forestry Administration, it may simply be given
the right to enforce compliance by communitymembers and outsiders with
the natural resource management rules speciﬁed in the contract.
Despite the diversity of contract implementation, some of the beneﬁts
arising from these contracts can be identiﬁed. For the local community,
a major beneﬁt appears to be that of securing community land uses and
access rights to the community area and resources, and that of excluding
outsiders, mainly members of other communities, from using the natural
resources covered by the contract. By delimiting plots on the map standing
for the collective management plan for natural resources and representing
areas overwhich rights transfer is requested, GELOSE translates customary
management rights into a legal form. This is not directly associated with
assignment of full property rights to the community members,12 but it is
expected by the community members to facilitate the future recognition
of private property rights by the state. This may be highly beneﬁcial for
certain members, since this process of state recognition of private property
12 This mechanism is called ‘se´curisation foncie`re relative’ (relative security of land
rights).
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rights is known to take a long time and to entail high costs. Hence, private
interests in land entitlement contribute, in many cases, to the willingness of
local community members to become involved in a GELOSE contract. The
desire to control land access by local communities, collectively or privately,
and to exclude people from outside the community are powerful driving
forces for requesting a contract. The community may also receive a share
of the ﬁnancial resources by charging certain users’ rights, collecting ﬁnes,
and levying certain users’ fees or taxes such as ‘ristournes’ and ‘redevances’.
The assignment of permits may, in some cases, come under the authority of
the CLB.
The Forestry Administration’s main interest in this process is to reduce
the costs of supervision and to limit the conﬂicts between local users, and
between local users and outsiders. These conﬂicts often end in bush or
forest ﬁres or in settlements inside the protected areas, or in illicit forest
clearing. It can also beneﬁt from the improved availability of information
and reinforced controls over natural resources exploitation achieved by the
new regulation systemmanaged by the CLB. It can thereby levy more taxes
(‘redevances’) for the allocation of commercial withdrawal rights or ‘permits’
over certain resources, even though the tax rates are lowered through the
contracting process. Hence, both the central administration and the local
community stand to gain by ensuring that established rules over natural
resources are respected.
The municipal government may have the same conﬂicting interest
in taking part in GELOSE. The tax income from the commercialization
of rough products, called the ‘ristournes’, have to be shared with the
local community. Nevertheless, it obtains better information about natural
resources exploitation, and thereby levies more ‘ristournes’. Another source
of conﬂicting interests may be the trade-offs between the municipal
government’s interest in territorial economic and social development on
the one hand and biodiversity conservation on the other.
The major beneﬁt of the contract for society as a whole arises from
the more sustainable management of natural resources, given that it is
in the interest of local stakeholders (CLB, municipal government) to ensure
the long-term conservation of resources in the area over which they have
secured rights of control and exclusion.
4.3. The information issue
At the beginning of the process, both the local community and the central
administrationareuncertain about thebeneﬁts thatwill result fromdifferent
sets of rules enforced for the management of natural resources. The
deﬁnition of the terms of each contract involves a process of identiﬁcation
and of understanding of what is at stake that will determine the decision
about how to govern the management of natural resources (Antona and
Babin, 2001). Both parties are involved in acquiring information and
deﬁning howmuch information to obtain about the beneﬁts of the different
potential management plans. Such information mostly relates to the
boundaries of the area overwhich the contract will be enforced, given that it
may be contested by other communities, and to the impact of the different
rules for the management of the natural resources of that area. Through
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the GELOSE policy, the local communities have incentives to acquire
information about how to better manage and control the exploitation of
the resources as stated by the Aghion and Tirole model. Hence, contractual
delegationmay result in better knowledge about how tomanage the natural
resources in a sustainablemanner, and better control of theway the resource
is used, given the greater involvement of the local community in decision
making.
The model supports the idea that local communities should be given
the right to manage natural resources over which they are better informed.
This reinforces the basic argument behind the community collaborative
approach and the involvement of local populations in natural resources
management: the grassroots communities possess a capacity to manage
information and to exercise control that cannot be equalled by the
central government (Kant, 1997). But this argument is challenged by the
ﬁeld of research on local governance. According to these analyses, local
governments may have better capacity than grassroots communities to
make use of the information and are assumed to effectively claim and
exert power (Ribot, 1999; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).
4.4. The congruence issue
The other aspect pointed out by the Aghion and Tirolemodel is the need for
congruence between the central government’s and the local community’s
interests.When formulating its request, the local community can ensure that
it is not requesting transfers of rights over natural resources for which the
central government’s interests diverge too strongly from those of the local
community, by excluding resources over which conﬂicts are too strong, for
example. Furthermore, the dialogue established through mediation during
contract negotiationmaymodify the expectations of the contracting parties,
and hence, increase the congruence in their objectives, thus favouring
delegation. The mediation process can be thought of as a means to achieve
lesser dissonance and, therefore, better congruence between the central
government and the local community.
The government is rarely willing to delegate responsibility for resources
that generate substantial beneﬁts, and which are regarded as strategic. This
is clearly the case for shrimps,which cannot be included in themanagement
plans proposed by the community and which remain under state control.
Furthermore, when tourism beneﬁts are expected in some areas, these are
less likely to be concerned by GELOSE contracts. On the other hand, as
mentioned earlier, GELOSE contracts are more likely to be established
in areas where resources are severely degraded, and where government
interests are limited.
Moreover, congruence of interests emerges around the transfer of
exclusion rights, which can be seen as a beneﬁt both by the central
government and by the CLB, as commonly observed in the studied
contracts.
5. Discussion
The ﬁrst part of the discussion focuses on the involvement of certain
stakeholders, and on organizational aspects, which are not highlighted
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in the model. These are the collective nature of the parties and the role
of NGOs. Our second concern relates to the freedom of action associated
with the actual transferred rights. Along with the freedom of action, the
nature of the contract is at stake. A major issue is to determine whether
implementation of the GELOSE policy gives rise to a real transfer of rights
or if it is simply a policy by which local communities are made to manage
resources in an externally deﬁned way stated in the contract (Aubert et al.,
2001).
5.1. The collective nature of the parties
In the model, each agent is considered as a single decision-making entity.
But both the local community and the Water and Forestry Administration
are, in fact, collective levels of decision. Divergence of opinion may be
expressed among their members.
The institutional component of the GELOSE policy linked to the
creation and functioning of the CLB, which is intended to represent
collective local interests and implement the GELOSE contract, should not
be underestimated. Through the GELOSE contract, the previous individual
control exerted by the forest ofﬁcer is now replaced or reinforced by
local collective control, and is thus, generally enhanced. As already
mentioned, enforcement of the contract by the local community relies on
the customary system of social rules through the deﬁnition of a ‘dina’. In
the ‘dina’, rules are clearly stated and sanctions are imposed for each type
of offence that might be encountered. Reliance on the ‘dina’ to enforce
the contract has several advantages. Like all customary rights, the ‘dina’
may evolve in response to changing resource dynamics, for example.
Through this enforcement mechanism, adaptive management becomes
possible. Nevertheless, problems of internal consistency may appear. The
effectiveness of the rules will depend on the distribution of power among
the communitymembers. Rules are effectivewhen they constrain aminority
of members, or the least inﬂuential ones (lumberjacks), or when they are
supported by a majority (Pe´chard, 2002).
Within the Water and Forestry Administration, the agents working
directly for the central government do not always have the same interests as
those living near the community and directly in charge of supervising the
use of natural resources. Before theGELOSE implementation, the latterwere
responsible for deliveringpermits, for controlling the exploitation of natural
resources, and for sanctioning and collecting ﬁnes. Due to the lack of control
within the administration, they were not obliged to systematically report
transactions to their supervisor. Theymay thus be unwilling to implement a
GELOSE policywhich takes away a part of their income. On the other hand,
for the central government, the GELOSE policy may be a way of gaining
information and transparency about natural resources management, since
reports are written and made public by the CLB and veriﬁed both by the
administration and by the municipal government.
5.2. The legitimacy of NGO involvement
One of the objectives legitimizing the GELOSE policy was its contribution
to a more sustainable management of biodiversity, whose beneﬁts
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extend beyond the scope of local communities and central government.
Biodiversity conservation has some of the features of a global public
good, which is of concern for environmental NGOs, and explains their
involvement in GELOSE policy implementation.
NGOs may actually have major interests at stake for several reasons.
Firstly, more funds are now devoted to community-based natural resources
management in response to the recent orientations of international
institutions. Secondly, the GELOSE approach solves prior conﬂicts between
NGOagents, previously responsible for exercising control, and local people.
NGO agents may even gain political inﬂuence from the implementation of
a management transfer. Thirdly, they might gain some power over natural
resources regulation, since local partners are more likely to be inﬂuenced.
The involvement of the NGOs in the contracting process, which may
result in close links between the mediator and the NGO operator of the
GELOSE policy, may have adverse effects. Firstly, it may be a source of bias
in the negotiation process, since the mediator cannot always be considered
as neutral. Secondly, the NGO, which gets involved in the process, often
appears as the provider of the new rights. Thus, the process eases relations
between the NGO and local people, but does not modify relations between
local people and government ofﬁcials as it is supposed to do. Finally,
the relation that develops between the NGO and the CLB during the
implementation process may affect the reliability of the contract. Unlike
the formal mediator, NGOs do not leave the process after signature of the
contract, but support its implementation. NGOs involved in biodiversity
conservation are often external donor agencies and are associated with
major ﬁnancial andpolitical interests. For the central government, enforcing
the contract might then be more closely related to the desire to maintain
relations with the conservation agency than to provide management rights
incentives (Pe´chard, 2002). Consequently, the NGOs often become a central
player in the governance mode they implement but in which they do not
constitute a contracting party. As their intervention is limited in time,
the viability of the arrangement should never be dependent upon their
presence.
5.3. The nature of the contract and enforcement issues
Transferred rights are mainly exclusion rights, seldom management
rights.13 This limits the freedom of action actually obtained by the
CLB. Exclusion rights are transferred because the interests of the central
government and those of local communities converge on this point (see
section 4). The CLB has thus gained formal authority to decide who is
allowed to use the natural resources.Whenmanagement rights are formally
transferred, they are actually shared with the State. The management
transfer is contingent to the acceptance of local rules by the State. This
is justiﬁed by the need to safeguard the public interest and to signify that
the government remains the legal owner of the resources. However, it limits
the CLB’s capacity to inﬂuence rule making. What is at stake is the CLB’s
13 The GELOSE policy is nevertheless often qualiﬁed as a process of management
rights transfer.
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autonomy todevise rules for theuse of natural resources in its area; likewise,
the capacity of the rural community to exert its rights and effectively enforce
them (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001).
Do the rules stipulated in the GELOSE contracts result from an
explicit negotiation between the central government and the CLB or do
they consist in a package of rules, deﬁned and proposed beforehand
for acceptance by local people? Addressing this question may help
to evaluate the incentives arising from the policy. Emphasis is placed
on the symmetry of the relation between the parties during the
negotiation, and especially on the gains and losses resulting from the
contract. According to Maldidier C. (2001), ‘despite the asymmetry
in their relation (administration and local communities), forms of
compromise reﬂect an implicit negotiation, whose general terms would
be: Water and Forests Administration delegate a share of their respons-
ibilities in forest control, in exchange for a limitation of community user
rights and their commitment to self-regulation of forest clearing practices’.
In linewithAghion andTirole’smodel, the rules designed in theGELOSE
contracts can be classiﬁed as follows (i) Rules for which the stakes are
high for the central government. Regulation of forest clearing practices
and resources inside protected areas remain under the responsibility of
the government services. (ii) Rules for which the stakes are high for
local people but not so high for the central government, and which
can now be tailored to local conditions. This is the case of boundary
rules. These rules either conﬁrm de facto rules or raise conﬂicts to be
solved locally. (iii) Some rules are restrictive but are associated with new
responsibility over others. In some contracts, wood harvesting is now
restricted to domestic use only. But at the same time, these contracts
recognize the new possibility for CLB members to obtain wood permits
directly from the CLB committee without referring to the forest ofﬁcer
anymore.
GELOSE contracts give local people the right to tailor certain rules and
acquired legal rights and responsibilities over resources located in what
is now accepted to be their territory. Open discussion within the village
committee for modifying the level of wood permits, inconceivable a few
years ago, is now frequent. Nevertheless, further progress is needed to give
local people a real choice between all possible rules in respect of the public
interest. Negotiation is generally implicit, meaning that rules are mainly
deﬁned outside the mediation arena. The relation between the parties
during the process appears to be one of ‘proposal–acceptance’ (proposal
of a package of rules by the central government and acceptance by the
CLB), rather than an explicit negotiation where consensus emerges within
the negotiation arena. Given the interests at stake for the CLB, it may be
considered too hazardous to negotiate and to risk a total refusal of rights
transfer. Consequently, the proposed rules are always accepted. However,
this acceptance does not necessarily mean a strong commitment to all the
rules and an effective enforcement of the contract. For instance, in the
Andapa region, rules that restrict wood harvesting to domestic use only,
are poorly enforced. These rules prohibit the sale of wood to peoplewho are
not members of the CLB, but people cannot afford to give up their revenue
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from selling harvested wood, and no incentive system other than a simple
ban has been proposed to regulate wood sales to outsiders.
Amajor stake is the requirement in terms of human capacity for deﬁning
and effectively implementing management plans on behalf of the local
community, and for supervising them. Some rights are legally transferred
to the CLB, but as yet they still lack recognition from outsiders, from local
forest ofﬁcers, and from NGOs.
5.4. The reliability and robustness issues
If the government were to learn that some resources have a higher value
outside the contract than within, it might not be willing to respect its
commitment to give control over resources management to the local
community. The government’s freedom to reverse the process and to take
back the rights previously granted to the local community through the
GELOSE process must then be considered. As the government always
remains the owner of the resources, it can unilaterally decide to terminate
the contract if forestry legislation changes. In that case, the CLBs might be
compensated for their loss even if it is not clearly deﬁned. The contract,
in its ﬁrst stage of implementation, covers a short three-year period, and
apparently there is no irreversibility in the transfer. Furthermore, while the
CLB has a speciﬁc mechanism for enforcing the contract – the ‘dina’ – the
forestry administration does not. This should mean that the CLB is subject
to amuch higher level of requirement in the implementation of the contract.
Nevertheless, the very short time since the ﬁrst contractswere implemented
and the limited number of contracts already signedmake it very difﬁcult to
provide a clear answer to this issue. Little information is available to assess
the reliability of the contracts and the actual trends.
Furthermore, as alreadymentioned, there is substantial variability among
the contracts, both in terms of the resources that are involved and of the uses
of these resources. Hence, what is at stake in each contract cannot always be
compared. Some contracts address only personal uses of natural resources,
and do not entail major conﬂicts of interest. Other contracts are deﬁned
over large territories and include large-scale commercial uses. Hence, the
ﬁrst kind of contract is less likely to be challenged than the second.
It is worth noting that the GELOSE procedure has not been deﬁned once
and for all, except for the elements clearly stipulated in the law. It is liable
to evolve over time, depending on its success.14
6. Conclusion
Faced with natural resources and biodiversity depletion, and with the
failure of central policies, Madagascar chose to modify its property rights
regime covering biological resources. Economic analysis of themechanisms
set up within the GELOSE policy sheds light on some of the issues. As
shown by our application of the Aghion and Tirole model, the GELOSE
14 The success of the procedure is basically measured in terms of the quantity of
contracts signed throughout Madagascar, though a more appropriate evaluation
procedure, taking account of qualitative factors not directly apparent with this
single criterion, is now being considered.
Environment and Development Economics 843
policy is designed to delegate rights over natural resources to the local
communities. It intends to give new autonomy to these communities in
their uses of natural resources, to give them incentives to collect information
about the state of the resources – users and current uses – and to transmit
this information to the administration through the contracting process.
This delegation is clearly in line with the desire of international ﬁnancial
institutions for the central government to limit its role and to concentrate
on its basic functions.
Congruence between the interests of the parties appears to be a major
concern for the actual development of the GELOSE contracts. This can be
linked to the ambition of the GELOSE policy to interlink the legal system of
management, which has formal authority but does not have sufﬁcient con-
trol capacity to fully supervise resourcesmanagement or to resolve conﬂicts,
and the customary system thatworkswithin the rural communities. Though
havingno legal status, the latter is always considered tohave true legitimacy
(Razaﬁndrabe and Thompson, 1994). Each system has its own objectives.
The congruence of objectives has been shown to be a key factor for
delegation. An interesting feature of the GELOSE policy is the presence of a
mediator during the negotiationprocesswho facilitates communication and
contributes to ensuring that the objectives of the parties become congruent.
Nevertheless, this ofﬁcial mediation is difﬁcult to actually implement and
has led in some cases to informal mediation (Pe´chard, 2002).
Another element is the need for the rural community to organize
itself into a legal association – the CLB – to claim rights over resource
management and to become involved in a GELOSE contract. The
constitution of such associations is favoured by the decentralization process
that brings decision-making processes and local economic interests closer
together. But it may also limit the participation of some members of
the rural communities such as migrants. The success of the devolution
process depends on the capacity of the local communities to exert real
authority in devising effective management rules, and then to supervise
natural resources management. The political decentralization process may
have been a pre-condition for implementation of the GELOSE policy. It
reinforces the local structures and enhances the capacity building at the
local level and the control over natural resource management by the local
communities. Thus, it may favour the existence of spontaneous requests for
GELOSE contracting, even though these were observed only in few cases.
Conversely, theGELOSEpolicy gives legitimacy to the control bymunicipal
governments over natural resources pertaining to municipal areas.
Though the GELOSE contract may seem attractive in terms of the rights
it gives to local communities, the GELOSE policy has not achieved its
goal in terms of numbers of contracts signed in its ﬁrst four years of
implementation (Aubert, 2002). As already stated, transferred rights are
mainly exclusion rights. The common point of most contracts is that
the CLB receives the right to exclude non-members from access to the
transferred resource over delimited areas. When the CLB authorizes access
to transferred resources, theymay levy user fees. Moremanageable policies
for transferring resources management to local communities have been
implemented since theGELOSEpolicy. But they do not involve the securing
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of land and can be compared with usual community-based management
plans enforced by the Forestry Administration and NGOs.
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Appendix 1: The Aghion and Tirole model
In this model, the utilities of the principal and the agent in the cases of
delegation and integration are described. The optimal effort of acquiring
information by the two agents under these two situations is then compared.
When the principal’s preferred project is chosen, its beneﬁt is noted B. In
that case, the agent’s expected beneﬁt is β.b where β is called a parameter
of congruence. Symmetrically, when the agent’s preferred project is chosen,
its beneﬁt is noted b. In that case, the principal’s expected beneﬁt is α.B
where α is the principal’s parameter of congruence. α, β ∈ [0, 1].
E is the probability that the principal will acquire perfect information on
the project’s beneﬁts and (1−E), the probability of not learning anything. It
comes at a cost gP(E). E can be seen as a measure of the supervision exerted
by the principal.
e is the agent’s probability of being informed about the projects’ beneﬁts
and (1− e), the probability of not getting any information over the projects.
The cost of acquiring information for the agent is noted gA(e). emeasures
the initiative of the agent.
E and e represent the respective strategies of the principal and of the
agent for acquiring information.
Then, in the case of integration, the agent’s and principal’s utilities can
be written as follows
Up = E .B+ (1− E).e.α.B− gp(E)
Ua = E .β.b+ (1− E).e.b− gA(e)
The principal’s optimal strategy is determined by the following equation
(1−α.E).e.B = g′P (E) and the optimal strategy
of the agent by (1− E).b= g′A(e)
When delegation takes place, the agent’s and principal’s utilities are then
the following
Udp = E .α.B+ (1− E).e.B− gp(E)
Uda = E .b+ (1−E).e.β.b− gA(e)
In that case, the principal’s optimal strategy is determined by the following
equation
(1− e).B = g′P (E) and the optimal strategy
of the agent by (1−β.E).b= g′A(e).
By comparing the ﬁrst-order conditions in both cases, it can be shown that
E* > E*d and e < e*d. The level of effort made by the agent under delegation
is greater than that reached in the case of integration. The reverse holds
for the principal. There is a trade-off between the control of the principal,



















Appendix 2. A review of existing GELOSE contracts
Resource category Location GELOSE contracts Operator
Small dry forests Sakaraha (West/South) 5 signed GELOSE contracts NEO-WWF
new contracts planned
Secondary or deteriorated Tulear (West/South) 1 signed contract Local NGO-NEO
dry forests New contracts planned
Dry forests Ejeda (West/South) 1 signed contract NEO
Dry forests Diego (North) 1 signed contract NGO
Dry forests Mahajanga (North) 5 signed GELOSE contracts CIRAD-FOFIFA
(fuelwood management) 30 contracts planned
Moist forest Fort Dauphin (West/South) 1 signed contract CAF
4 planned contracts
Moist forest Merikanjaka (Centre) 1 contract signed NEO- FDP
Tapia forest Arivonimamo(Centre) 2 signed GELOSE contracts NEO-FDP
9 planned
Moist forest Ambalavoa (Centre) 1 signed contract, WWF-NEO
several planned
Fragments of moist Andapa (East) 3 signed GELOSE contracts, some NEO- WWF
forests near P.A. contracts signed locally, 10 planned.
Moist forest near P.A. Masoala (East) Contract with lumberjacks CARE
Moist forests and plantations Ambatolampy (East) 1 contract with forestry cooperative. PDFIV-DIREF
Plantations Fort Dauphin (West/South) 1 signed contract WWF
Raphia and small residual Brickaville (East) 2 signed GELOSE contracts on raphia NEO
moist forests. 1 signed contract for residual forest
Freshwater lake Antsirabe (Centre) Demand from the CLB -
Notes: NEO: National Environmental Ofﬁce, DIREF: Forestry service; WWF, CARE: NGO managers of ICDPs.
Source: Maldidier (2000) and ONE, Cellule GELOSE, Bilan des contrats, 2001.
